Tesla Model S 2019

• Recall 257815 [USA]: Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the pws sounds are muted, increasing the risk of a crash.
  Tesla, inc. (tesla) is recalling certain 2013, 2018-2021 model s, 2020-2021 model x, 2018-2022 model 3, and 2020-2022 model y vehicles. A factory reset muted the pedestrian warning system (pws) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of federal motor vehicle safety standard number 141, "minimum sound requirements for hybrid and electric vehicles."
  tesla released an over-the-air (ota) software update, release 2023.44.30.14, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed april 27, 2024. Owners may contact tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is sb-24-00-006.
  owners may also contact the national highway traffic safety administration vehicle safety hotline at 1-888-327-4236 (tty 1-800-424-9153), or go to www.Nhtsa.Gov.

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• Recall 260283 [USA]: Warning lights with a smaller font size can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash.
  Tesla, inc. (tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2023 model s, 2016-2024 model x, 2017-2023 model 3, 2019-2024 model y, and 2024 cybertruck vehicles. An incorrect font size is displayed on the instrument panel for the brake, park, and antilock brake system (abs) warning lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of federal motor vehicle safety standard number 105, "hydraulic and electric brake systems" and 135, "light vehicle brake systems."
  tesla began releasing an over-the-air (ota) software update, free of charge. Owners may contact tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is sb-24-00-003.
  owners may also contact the national highway traffic safety administration vehicle safety hotline at 1-888-327-4236 (tty 1-800-424-9153), or go to www.Nhtsa.Gov.

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• Recall 238648 [USA]: In certain circumstances when autosteer is engaged, and the driver does not maintain responsibility for vehicle operation and is unprepared to intervene as necessary or fails to recognize when autosteer is canceled or not engaged, there may be an increased risk of a crash.
  Tesla, inc. (tesla) is recalling 2012-2023 model s, 2016-2023 model x, 2017-2023 model 3, and 2020-2023 model y vehicles equipped with all versions of autosteer leading up to the version(s) that contains the recall remedy. In certain circumstances when autosteer is engaged, the prominence and scope of the feature's controls may not be sufficient to prevent driver misuse of the sae level 2 advanced driver-assistance feature.
  tesla will release an over-the-air (ota) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed february 10, 2024. Owners may contact tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is sb-23-00-008.
  owners may also contact the national highway traffic safety administration vehicle safety hotline at 1-888-327-4236 (tty 1-800-424-9153), or go to www.Nhtsa.Gov.

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• Recall 249445 [USA]: Fsd beta software that allows a vehicle to exceed speed limits or travel through intersections in an unlawful or unpredictable manner increases the risk of a crash.
  Tesla, inc. (tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2023 model s, model x, 2017-2023 model 3, and 2020-2023 model y vehicles equipped with full self-driving beta (fsd beta) software or pending installation. The fsd beta system may allow the vehicle to act unsafe around intersections, such as traveling straight through an intersection while in a turn-only lane, entering a stop sign-controlled intersection without coming to a complete stop, or proceeding into an intersection during a steady yellow traffic signal without due caution. In addition, the system may respond insufficiently to changes in posted speed limits or not adequately account for the driver's adjustment of the vehicle's speed to exceed posted speed limits.
  tesla will release an over-the-air (ota) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed april 15, 2023. Owners may contact tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is sb-23-00-001.
  owners may also contact the national highway traffic safety administration vehicle safety hotline at 1-888-327-4236 (tty 1-800-424-9153), or go to www.Nhtsa.Gov.

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• Recall 233736 [USA]: A loss of power steering assist can require greater steering effort, especially at low speeds, increasing the risk of a crash.
  Tesla, inc. (tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2021 model s and model x vehicles. The electronic power assist steering (epas) system may experience a loss of power steering assist when driving on rough roads or after hitting a pothole.
  tesla has released an over-the-air (ota) software update to recalibrate the epas system, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed december 31, 2022. Owners may contact tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is sb-22-00-014.
  owners may also contact the national highway traffic safety administration vehicle safety hotline at 1-888-327-4236 (tty 1-800-424-9153), or go to www.Nhtsa.Gov.

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• Recall 210230 [USA]: A delayed rearview camera image reduces the driver's rear view, increasing the risk of a crash.
  Tesla, inc. (tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2019 model s, model x, and 2017-2020 model 3 vehicles equipped with autopilot computer 2.5 and operating certain firmware releases. The rearview image may not immediately display when the vehicle begins to reverse. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of federal motor vehicle safety standard number 111, "rear visibility."
  tesla will perform an over-the-air (ota) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed may 17, 2022. Owners may contact tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is sb-22-00-004.
  owners may also contact the national highway traffic safety administration vehicle safety hotline at 1-888-327-4236 (tty 1-800-424-9153), or go to www.Nhtsa.Gov.

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• Recall 208803 [USA]: Failing to stop at a stop sign can increase the risk of a crash.
  Tesla, inc. (tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2022 model s and model x, 2017-2022 model 3, and 2020-2022 model y vehicles. The "rolling stop" functionality available as part of the full self-driving (beta) software may allow the vehicle to travel through an all-way stop intersection without first coming to a stop.
  tesla will perform an over-the-air (ota) software update that disables the "rolling stop" functionality, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed march 28, 2022. Owners may contact tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is sb-22-00-001.
  owners may also contact the national highway traffic safety administration vehicle safety hotline at 1-888-327-4236 (tty 1-800-424-9153), or go to www.Nhtsa.Gov.

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• Recall 181707 [USA]: If the primary latch is inadvertently released and the secondary latch is not engaged, the hood could open unexpectedly, obstructing the driver's view and increasing the risk of a crash.
  Tesla, inc. (tesla) is recalling certain 2014-2021 model s vehicles. The front trunk latch assembly may be misaligned, preventing the secondary hood latch from engaging. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of federal motor vehicle safety standard number 113, "hood latch system."
  tesla service will inspect and reposition the latch assembly as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed february 18, 2022. Owners may contact tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is sb-21-11-003.
  owners may also contact the national highway traffic safety administration vehicle safety hotline at 1-888-327-4236 (tty 1-800-424-9153), or go to www.Nhtsa.Gov.

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• Recall 183863 [USA]: Unexpected activation of the aeb system may cause the car to stop suddenly, increasing the risk of a crash.
  Tesla, inc. (tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2021 model s, model 3, model x, and 2020-2021 model y vehicles operating software version 2021.36.5.2. A communication error may cause false forward-collision warning (fcw) or unexpected activation of the automatic emergency brake (aeb) system.
  tesla service has released an over-the-air (ota) software update, free of charge. The recall began october 25, 2021. Owners may contact tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is sb-21-00-004.
  owners may also contact the national highway traffic safety administration vehicle safety hotline at 1-888-327-4236 (tty 1-800-424-9153), or go to www.Nhtsa.Gov.

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• Recall R/2022/009 [UK]: Misalignment of the hood latch may prevent latching of the secondary latch
  Misalignment of the hood latch may prevent latching of the secondary latch.
  inspect the secondary hood latch on affected vehicles. If the hood is not properly retained by the secondary latch the latch mechanism will be reassembled and repositioned to assure proper alignment.

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• Recall 2021783 [Canada]: Structure
  Issue: on certain vehicles, the front trunk (frunk) hood latch may not be positioned properly. As a result, the secondary latch may not hold the hood closed. This could cause the hood to open suddenly while driving if the primary hood latch is released. Safety risk: a hood that opens suddenly while driving could block the driver's view and increase the risk of a crash. Corrective actions: tesla will notify owners by e-mail and arrange for an inspection of the secondary hood latch. If the hood doesn't latch properly, tesla service will reassemble and reposition the latch mechanism.

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• Recall 2020497 [Canada]: Lights and instruments
  Issue: on certain vehicles, when switching the distance display setting from kilometers to miles, the speedometer displays the vehicle speed in miles per hour (mph) only. Canadian regulations require that speed be displayed in either kilometers per hour (km/h) or in both km/h and mph. Safety risk: this small error does not affect vehicle safety. Corrective actions: this is not a recall. Tesla has made changes to ensure that all new vehicle speedometers display mph and km/h when the display distance is set to miles. In addition, this change was sent to all vehicles in firmware update 2020.36.11.

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• Recall 2020435 [Canada]: Lights and instruments
  Issue: certain vehicles do not have the correct warning indicator to show when the passenger airbag is turned off. Recent changes to canadian regulations require all companies to use a symbol to show when the passenger airbag is turned off instead of text. This change can help to avoid confusion. Safety risk: this small error does not affect the function of the airbag system or the accuracy of the information displayed to the occupant. Corrective actions: this is not a recall. Tesla has made changes to ensure that all new vehicles display the correct symbol when the passenger airbag is turned off. In addition, this change was sent to all vehicles in firmware update 2020.36.

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To ensure accuracy and for your safety, it is recommended to do a free VIN recall check here or here [USA] - UK - Canada.

Bulletins are notices put out by manufacturers in conjunction with the NHTSA to notify the public of manufacturing issues or changes.

• Recall 23v838 remedy effectiveness investigation # RQ24009

  The office of defects investigation (odi) is opening a recall query to assess the remedy adequacy of recall 23v838. On december 12, 2023, tesla filed a defect information report (recall 23v838) applicable to all tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its autopilot system, which tesla described as an sae level 2 (l2) advanced driver assistance system (adas). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of tesla’s traffic-aware cruise control (tacc) and autosteer. In describing the safety defect, tesla’s defect information report (dir) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. Ea22002 (upgraded from pe21020) was opened to investigate whether tesla’s autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with tesla’s conclusion in its 23v838 recall filing. During ea22002, odi identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed recall 23v838 to address concerns regarding the autopilot system investigated in ea22002. Following deployment of the remedy in recall 23v838, odi identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary nhtsa tests of remedied vehicles. Also, tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to odi’s concerns under ea22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. Odi is therefore opening this recall query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23v838.
  

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• Sudden unintended acceleration investigation # DP23002

  The office of defects investigation (odi) received a petition requesting that odi reevaluate its decision to deny dp20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles 12vdc systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by odi in dp20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the dp20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at nhtsa.Gov under the following odi number: 11528471.
  

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• Shift interlock request investigation # DP23001

  On march 27, 2023, the office of defects investigation (odi) received a defect petition that requested a recall of all tesla vehicles model year (my) 2013 to present to add an interlock that requires a brake application by the driver in order to shift from drive to reverse to reduce the number of sudden unintended acceleration events. Along with his request, the petitioner provided a technical paper regarding the claims in the petition. Odi will evaluate the petitioners allegations and assess potentially related field data to determine if the petition should be granted or denied. If the petition is granted, odi will open a defect investigation. If the petition is denied, odi will publish a denial notice in the federal register. The petition and its supporting paper can be reviewed at nhtsa.Gov under the following odi number: 11515119.
  

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• Pedestrian alert sounds investigation # DP22005

  Nhtsa received a petition on or about july 18, 2022, requesting that federal motor vehicle safety standard (fmvss) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the united states. The petition can be reviewed at nhtsa.Gov under odi number 11486072.Fmvss 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kg or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after march 1, 2021.The petitioner asserts that hybrid and electric vehicles to which the standard does not apply should be found to contain a safety defect. In support of the petition, the petitioner includes findings contained in a bill introduced in the house of representatives in 2009, the pedestrian safety enhancement act of 2009, h.R. 734, 111th cong. (2009). A related bill, the pedestrian safety enhancement act of 2010, became law in january 2011 (pub. L. 111-373). The petitioner requests that nhtsa require all electric and hybrid vehicles comply with fmvss 141, regardless of production date.The defect petition has been opened to evaluate the issue and determine whether to grant or deny the petition.The associated product list is not exhaustive and may contain vehicles that are equipped with pedestrian alert sounds.
  

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• Autopilot & first responder scenes investigation # EA22002

  On august 13, 2021, nhtsa’s office of defects investigation (odi) opened a preliminary evaluation (pe21-020) to assess the performance of tesla’s autopilot system (a system characterized by tesla as an sae level 2 driving automation system designed to support and assist the driver in performing the driving task) available in tesla vehicles. The investigation opening was motivated by an accumulation of crashes in which tesla vehicles, operating with autopilot engaged, struck stationary in-road or roadside first responder vehicles tending to pre-existing collision scenes. Upon opening the investigation, nhtsa indicated that the pe would also evaluate additional similar circumstance crashes of tesla vehicles operating with autopilot engaged, as well as assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the driver’s engagement with the dynamic driving task during autopilot operation.Pe21-020 is upgraded to an engineering analysis (ea) to extend the existing crash analysis, evaluate additional data sets, perform vehicle evaluations, and to explore the degree to which autopilot and associated tesla systems may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. In doing so, nhtsa plans to continue its assessment of vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations.The attached detailed summary further describes nhtsa’s review to date and the basis for upgrade to an ea.
  

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• Autopilot system driver controls investigation # EA22002

  The office of defects investigation (odi) upgraded pe21020 to ea22002 on june 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the pe21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how tesla’s autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, odi collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from nhtsa human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that tesla calls traffic-aware cruise control (tacc) and autosteer. Tacc is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by tesla as an sae level 2 (“l2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with l2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the l2 system design and driver expectations. Odi completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to august 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, odi found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to ea22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, odi identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). Odi observed this pattern across all tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding nhtsa’s crash analysis is available in the ea22002 file. Odi reviewed these findings with tesla during several conversations in quarter 4 of 2023. On december 12, 2023, tesla filed a defect information report (dir) (recall 23v838) applicable to all tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its autopilot system. Tesla’s dir described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. Odi completed an extensive body of work via pe21020 and ea22002, which showed evidence that tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the l2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During ea220002, odi identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Odi’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with tesla’s conclusion in its defect information report, indicated that in certain circumstances, autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given tesla’s recall (23v838) of all vehicles equipped with autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, odi is closing ea22002. Concurrent with that closing, odi has opened a recall query (rq24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23v838 remedy. To review the odi reports cited in the closing resume odi report identification number document, go to nhtsa.Gov.
  

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• Tesla "passenger play" investigation # PE21023

  The office of defects investigation (odi) is opening a preliminary evaluation (pe) on certain model year (my) 2017 - 2022 model 3, s, x, and y vehicles based on reports that tesla gameplay functionality, which is visible on the front center touchscreen from the drivers seat, is enabled even when the vehicle is being driven. This functionality, referred to as “passenger play,” may distract the driver and increase the risk of a crash.Odi has received one vehicle owner questionnaire (voq) describing the gameplay functionality and has confirmed that this capability has been available since december 2020 in tesla "passenger play"-equipped vehicles. Prior to this time, gameplay was enabled only when the vehicle was in park.This pe has been opened to evaluate the driver distraction potential of tesla "passenger play" while the vehicle is being driven. Through this pe, odi will evaluate aspects of the feature, including the frequency and use scenarios of tesla "passenger play."the odi report cited above can be reviewed at: http://www-odi.Nhtsa.Dot.Gov/owners/searchnhtsaid using the following complaint identification number: 11439598
  

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• Tesla passenger play investigation # PE21023

  The office of defects investigation (odi) opened preliminary evaluation (pe21-023) on december 21, 2021, to evaluate the driver distraction potential and use frequency / circumstances of in-vehicle game-play functionality referred to as ?Passenger play? In certain model year (my) 2017-2022 tesla model 3, s, x, and y vehicles. Distracted driving can result in an increased risk of a crash. Pe21-023 was prompted by the receipt of vehicle owners questionnaire (voq) 11439598 from the owner of a 2021 model 3 on november 6, 2021. Odi sent an information request (ir) letter to tesla on january 20, 2022 and received tesla?S response on march 4, 2022.On december 24, 2020, tesla introduced passenger play to vehicles equipped with the intel atom processor (receiving an aftersale software update) via its 2020 holiday release. Passenger play permitted occupants to play specific games selected by tesla for primarily turn-based play style and limited gameplay motion with the transmission in drive and the vehicle in motion. Under these conditions, a notification would display on the screen and the screen area devoted to the game would reduce from 100% to accommodate vehicle controls and driving task data readout. Specific changes varied among models. On december 21, 2022, tesla voluntarily disabled passenger play capability with firmware release 2021.44.25.1 in response to nhtsa?S request. Tesla reported a month later that a 97% completion rate was achieved though tesla?S over the air (ota) update. Odi opened pe 21-023 to evaluate the driver distraction potential of tesla passenger play while the vehicle is being driven including aspects of the feature, frequency, and use scenarios.Based on the analysis conducted, pe21-023 has been closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by nhtsa that no safety-related defect exists. Furthermore, it does not foreclose the agency from taking further action, if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists through additional information the agency may receive.See attached closing report for a detailed summary of the investigation findings.
  

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• Desiccated air bag inflator rupture investigation # EA21002

  From 2000 through 2017, takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("psan") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004l. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 blomquist report at www.Nhtsa.Gov/sites/nhtsa.Gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.Pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in us vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004l that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated psan inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All takata inflators produced with propellant 2004l contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004l are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated psan inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- takata (now known as tk global), the independent testing coalition, and exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of takata desiccated psan inflators using propellant 2004l (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004l is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004l.The office of defects investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated psan frontal inflators manufactured by takata. This investigation will require extensive information on takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated psan inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.Gov/recalls?Nhtsaid=ea21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede ea15-001, which remains open.
  

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• Autopilot & first responder scenes investigation # PE21020

  Since january 2018, the office of defects investigation (odi) has identified eleven crashes in which tesla models of various configurations have encountered first responder scenes and subsequently struck one or more vehicles involved with those scenes. The incidents are listed at the end of this summary by date, city, and state.Most incidents took place after dark and the crash scenes encountered included scene control measures such as first responder vehicle lights, flares, an illuminated arrow board, and road cones. The involved subject vehicles were all confirmed to have been engaged in either autopilot or traffic aware cruise control during the approach to the crashes.Autopilot is an advanced driver assistance system (adas) in which the vehicle maintains its speed and lane centering when engaged within its operational design domain (odd). With the adas active, the driver still holds primary responsibility for object and event detection and response (oedr), e.G., identification of obstacles in the roadway or adverse maneuvers by neighboring vehicles during the dynamic driving task (ddt).Odi has opened a preliminary evaluation of the sae level 2 adas system (autopilot) in the model year 2014-2021 models y, x, s,and 3. The investigation will assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the drivers engagement with the dynamic driving task during autopilot operation. The investigation will additionally assess the oedr by vehicles when engaged in autopilot mode, and odd in which the autopilot mode is functional. The investigation will also include examination of the contributing circumstances for the confirmed crashes listed below and other similar crashes.Incident list datecity/county state07/10/2021san diego ca05/19/2021miamifl03/17/2021lansing mi02/27/2021montgomery county tx08/26/2020charlotte nc07/30/2020cochise countyaz01/22/2020west bridgewater ma12/29/2019cloverdale in12/10/2019norwalkct05/29/2018laguna beachca01/22/2018culver cityca
  

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• Sudden unintended acceleration investigation # DP20001

  On december 19, 2019, nhtsa received a petition from mr. Brian sparks requesting that the agency "recall all [tesla] model s, model x, and model 3 vehicles produced from 2013 to the present" due to sudden unintended acceleration (sua). In his petition and follow-up submissions, the petitioner identified a total of 232 non-duplicative complaints to nhtsa, including 203 reporting crashes. On january 13, 2020, nhtsas office of defects investigation (odi) opened defect petition dp20-001 to evaluate the petitioner’s request. Odis evaluation included reviews of all complaints and supporting information referenced by the petitioner, as well as 14 additional complaints to nhtsa related to sua crash allegations that were either not selected by the petitioner or were submitted after the petitioners most recent submission. The review also included analyses of available crash data (edr, tesla log data, and/or video data) the agency acquired as part of the evaluation.After reviewing the available data, odi has not identified evidence that would support opening a defect investigation into sua in the subject vehicles. In every instance in which event data was available for review by odi, the evidence shows that sua crashes in the complaints cited by the petitioner have been caused by pedal misapplication. There is no evidence of any fault in the accelerator pedal assemblies, motor control systems, or brake systems that has contributed to any of the cited incidents. There is no evidence of a design factor contributing to increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. The theory provided of a potential electronic cause of sua in the subject vehicles is based upon inaccurate assumptions about system design and log data.Nhtsa is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the agency’s investigation shows a defect in design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 u.S.C. §§ 30102(a)(9), 30118. Since the information before the agency is not indicative of a vehicle-based defect, it is unlikely that any investigation opened because of granting this petition would result in an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect. Therefore, upon full consideration of the information presented in the petition and the potential risks to safety, the petition is denied. The denial of this petition does not foreclose the agency from taking further action if warranted or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the agency may receive.The reference numbers for the complaints to nhtsa cited by the petitioner can be found in the petition submission documents in the public file for dp20-001. Those complaints and the 14 complaints odi added to its evaluation can be viewed at nhtsa.Gov. The reference numbers for the complaints added by odi are: 11385350, 11383955, 11383233, 11383180, 11378492, 11378458, 11302076, 11299698, 11290006, 11190595, 11174504, 11115496, 11096644 and 11000097. The attached report, further detailing nhtsa’s reasons for denial of the petition, will be published in the federal register.
  

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• Battery management software updates investigation # DP19005

  In a letter dated september 17, 2019, mr. Edward chen petitioned the nhtsa to initiate a defect investigation of certain tesla model s and model x vehicles that received revised battery management software in one or more over-the-air (ota) updates from tesla, beginning in may 2019. The petitioner bases his request on vehicle fires that took place worldwide and ota software updates tesla made to the battery management system (bms) of certain tesla vehicles that resulted in loss of available vehicle mileage range and increased charging durations.On october 1, 2019, the office of defects investigation (odi) opened dp19-005 to evaluate the petitioner’s request. Information provided by tesla in response to odis information request letter for dp19-005 indicated that a firmware update that may limit maximum voltage was installed in certain my 2012 through 2016 model s vehicles (subject vehicles). The voltage limiting firmware is a dynamic algorithm that is enabled in vehicles with high supercharging use histories, which contributes to high usage stress to the high-voltage (hv) battery. Tesla sold approximately 61,781 subject vehicles in the united states and, through august 2021, the voltage limiting firmware had been enabled in approximately 2,062 vehicles. Through december 2020, odi identified 59 complaints from consumers alleging reductions in battery capacity (52) or charging speed (7) in the subject vehicles. Log data from these vehicles showed that the voltage limiting firmware had been enabled in about 58 percent (30 of 52) of the complaints alleging range loss. Subsequent updates have restored some or all of the battery capacity to vehicles affected by the voltage limiting firmware coupled with updates enhancing bms battery brick monitoring algorithms. None of the complaint vehicles have reported any thermal incidents or other safety hazards related to the hv battery.The five non-crash fires referenced in the petition include two fires that occurred in china in early 2019 involving vehicles that: 1) had recently completed supercharging sessions; 2) were at a high state-of-charge (soc) of the hv battery; 3) were parked with the battery cooling system shutoff; and 4) had histories of high-stress usage for the hv batteries. The three fires that occurred outside china did not involve the same fact patterns regarding vehicle state and charging history. The two fires that occurred in the united states include one involving a vehicle with no supercharging history that was driving when the fire occurred and another in which the origin of the fire was external to the hv battery. The fifth fire, which also originated external to the hv battery, involved a vehicle in germany that had been parked at a low soc for an extended period. To date, incidents of fires involving parked vehicles with recent supercharging and histories of high-stress use have only been observed in china, where high-stress use factors appear to be more common. Nhtsa is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the agency’s investigation shows a defect in the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 u.S.C. §§ 30102(a)(9), 30118. Given the absence of any incidents in the united states related to fast charging, and the absence of any such incidents globally since may 2019, it is unlikely that an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect would be issued due to any investigation opened as a result of granting this petition. Therefore, upon full consideration of the information presented in the petition, and the potential risks to safety, the petition is denied. The denial of this petition does not foreclose the agency from taking further action if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the agency may receive.See docket no. Nhtsa-2020-0104
  

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Cracked rim. Unacceptable i have had to replace about 6 tires on my car that has 17,600 miles. I did not notice anything other than my tires keep going flat. Tesla keeps telling me to replace my tires to make money off me but its the rims that are the problem.

Cracked rim. Unacceptable i have had to replace about 6 tires on my car that has 17,600 miles. I did not notice anything other than my tires keep going flat. Tesla keeps telling me to replace my tires to make money off me but its the rims that are the problem.

At ~5,000 total vehicle miles, our 2019 model s performance had sudden and complete power steering assist failure at highway speeds, possibly concurrent with autopilot (autosteer) failure. Either i, or the autopilot system, turned off the autopilot feature at or near a slight curve on an interstate freeway. Immediate "startle" reaction was that the autopilot feature was "fighting" me for control as i turned the steering wheel to keep the car on the freeway, with extreme effort. The reality is most likely that this "fighting" was only the immediate impression caused by the massive amount of effort required to turn the steering wheel, despite being at speeds in the 60-70 mph range. Soon noted a scrolling series of warning messages: a. "steering assist reduced: steering may require increased effort." [which is a gross understatement.] b. "autopilot safety/convenience features unavailable: features may be restored on next drive." [which, after the car had sat parked for ~30 minutes, were restored.] user-visible mcu-display failure log revealed the following supplemental failure codes (with the probable times of failure):: 1. 17:26/app_w207: autosteer temporarily unavailable 2. 17:20/app_w264 autopilot safety/convenience features unavailable: features may be restored on next drive i feel very strongly that this sort of power steering failure would likely have resulted in a less experienced driver suspecting the steering had "locked up" and be causal to a major accident. Given the circumstances of the failure mode, and at these speeds, fatalities could be likely. Of note, this is at least the fourth time this has occurred to us, but the first with this car; all other events were in a 2017 model s performance, also at very low total mileage. After a failed repair attempt, that model s was traded in to tesla for this model s . . . .

At ~5,000 total vehicle miles, our 2019 model s performance had sudden and complete power steering assist failure at highway speeds, possibly concurrent with autopilot (autosteer) failure. Either i, or the autopilot system, turned off the autopilot feature at or near a slight curve on an interstate freeway. Immediate "startle" reaction was that the autopilot feature was "fighting" me for control as i turned the steering wheel to keep the car on the freeway, with extreme effort. The reality is most likely that this "fighting" was only the immediate impression caused by the massive amount of effort required to turn the steering wheel, despite being at speeds in the 60-70 mph range. Soon noted a scrolling series of warning messages: a. "steering assist reduced: steering may require increased effort." [which is a gross understatement.] b. "autopilot safety/convenience features unavailable: features may be restored on next drive." [which, after the car had sat parked for ~30 minutes, were restored.] user-visible mcu-display failure log revealed the following supplemental failure codes (with the probable times of failure):: 1. 17:26/app_w207: autosteer temporarily unavailable 2. 17:20/app_w264 autopilot safety/convenience features unavailable: features may be restored on next drive i feel very strongly that this sort of power steering failure would likely have resulted in a less experienced driver suspecting the steering had "locked up" and be causal to a major accident. Given the circumstances of the failure mode, and at these speeds, fatalities could be likely. Of note, this is at least the fourth time this has occurred to us, but the first with this car; all other events were in a 2017 model s performance, also at very low total mileage. After a failed repair attempt, that model s was traded in to tesla for this model s . . . .

I was driving my 2019 model s tesla on autopilot down the freeway at freeway speed when suddenly it started braking and the alarms went off as if reacting to an impending collision. Only, there was nothing in front of me to react to. The guy behind me rear ended me and spun across traffic lanes. Thankfully, everyone walked away from this with what we think is just whiplash at this time - it could have been so much worse!

I was driving my 2019 model s tesla on autopilot down the freeway at freeway speed when suddenly it started braking and the alarms went off as if reacting to an impending collision. Only, there was nothing in front of me to react to. The guy behind me rear ended me and spun across traffic lanes. Thankfully, everyone walked away from this with what we think is just whiplash at this time - it could have been so much worse!

2019 tesla model s in junkyard https://www.Iaai.Com/vehicledetails/36985305?Rownumber=5 and guess what..... The back wheel fell off! That's it...Back wheel fell off. Photos show that all the giblets are stretched and snapped. Do you really think it is acceptable that these heavy high powered cars have suspension components with the mechanical properties of swiss cheese?? Yours whompily keef wivaneff

2019 tesla model s in junkyard https://www.Iaai.Com/vehicledetails/36985305?Rownumber=5 and guess what..... The back wheel fell off! That's it...Back wheel fell off. Photos show that all the giblets are stretched and snapped. Do you really think it is acceptable that these heavy high powered cars have suspension components with the mechanical properties of swiss cheese?? Yours whompily keef wivaneff

Nhts complaint entry 2020-08-07 narrative section: on two separate days while driving mid-morning or mid-day in a straight trajectory on smooth and level road surface and not braking both the driver's and the center console's display and touch panel, respectively, simultaneously turned completely black so as to display nothing, just a completely blank, black panel. The first occasion was on a highway at approximately 55 mph speed. The second occasion was on a residential street at approximately 40 mph speed. The displays returned in the same manner as from a system reboot. However, the system reboot appeared to occur independent of my efforts to induce a system reboot. I was holding down the two opposite side steering wheel buttons in the usual way for a system reboot, but there was no response within the expected interval of perhaps 10 to 20 seconds. The system rebooted within a minute, seemingly on its own, and all touch panel and display features appeared to return to normal. There was no corresponding auditory signal nor visual graphic before or after the incident. As immediately stopping was not practical during either incident i continued driving without loss of steering, accelerator or braking functions. My recollection is that the two incidents occurred a few days apart. The date provided is an estimate of the first occasion.